Jacob Stevens 
Melbourne Victory's Nishan Velupillay holds off Melbourne City's Aziz Behich to score in the Melbourne Derby. Photo: Marcus Robertson/Round Ball Australia
The Melbourne Derby highlighted a significant flaw in Melbourne City’s game plan: their rest defence.
Melbourne Victory were able to absolutely dominate the first half, pressing effectively, and forcing turnovers that City couldn’t prevent turning into counter attacks.
City were outplayed, outgunned and their rest defence played a crucial role in that.
So, what exactly is a rest defence? Why does it matter? And what did City do so poorly that they ended up conceding three goals in the first half?
What is a rest defence?
The single underlying principle that governs the idea of rest defence is this: how well set up is a side to transition from attacking phases of play, into defensive phases of play?
It is, at its core, all about making transition between being in and out off possession as easy and efficient as possible.
The ‘rest’ in the term rest defence relates not to relaxation or lack of effort, but rather the ‘rest’ of the players: what is left over.
Hence, rest defence applies specifically to the players that are not involved in the attacking phases of play. Typically these will be your defenders and deeper-lying midfielders.
A good rest defence will have a well-structured back line and midfield, and is usually seen with a counter-press – where the attacking players immediately press the ball when they lose possession.
That way, a team can press to try and win the ball back immediately, while simultaneously keeping a good structure at the back should the opposition get through the press.
How does a rest defence work?
Well, that’s the beauty of football. There’s a million different ways to approach the same thing.
For instance, a 4-2-3-1 formation can play in possession with a back three, or a back two. They can invert a fullback, launch them both up the wings, drop the striker deeper; whatever.
But the shape they choose in possession of the ball will dictate how they then transition to their defensive shape.
Take this example using the same 4-2-3-1 formation:
Playing a back three gives them more defensive structure in transition, but has one fewer player in attack compared to a back two.
They’re also reliant on the players not involved – the three defenders and either both the double pivot players or one of the pivot players and the right back depending on the counter-press.
That’s how a rest defence works. You can see that even from that there are different ways to approach the transition – they can press, or drop and settle earlier – but it is all dependent upon the shape they choose when attacking.
So what did Melbourne City’s rest defence look like?
City, who lined up with a mish-mash of personnel, used a back two in possession, the two centre backs sitting wide, with goalkeeper Patrick Beach occasionally stepping up to make a back three.
The team looked to keep their width, with Marco Tilio and Yonatan Cohen staying high and wide, Andrew Nabbout playing centrally, and Steven Ugarkovic joining Nathaniel Atkinson in the middle.
While this 2-3 structure is hardly uncommon, City’s issues stemmed from a combination of execution, width and being outplayed in the middle.
It is also not a structure that meshes well with the basic defensive shape they were looking to play in – which was a 4-4-2 diamond, with Trewin in the hole and Atkinson a bit higher up creating a diamond shape.
Remember – a good rest defence is all about setting yourself up to transition effectively between attacking and defensive phases of play – and too many rotations can cause confusion and leave too much space between the lines.
Usually where a team plays a rest defence that is not conducive to a quick drop back into their standard shape, they will look to press relentlessly to afford as much time as possible to get players back into position.
City did not do that. And when they did press, the Victory midfield of Ryan Teague and Jordi Valadon showed their class in bypassing it easily.
The first goal is a big indication of the failings of City’s rest defence.
Sure, things weren’t helped by Samuel Souprayen losing his aerial duel, but with the fullbacks a level higher than the isolated back two, it meant Velupillay could run free into space on the right, leaving Aziz Behich nothing to do but follow along for the ride.
Similarly, for the second goal, one can point out the rest defence as a cause.
With Talbot so advanced, it forced Trewin across to cover, leaving extra space in the middle for the cross.
Of course, execution of the marking scheme comes into play – the two centre backs were too deep and not marking any runners – but that’s in part because they had to drop to not be beaten in behind by Reno Piscopo.
City have to learn from this. If they’re planning on using a 2-3 rest defence, one simple change that might help is to stay slightly narrower, meaning their shape is more compact in transition and leaves less space in the central areas.
Additionally, a more effective press would help, giving the fullbacks time to get back into their defensive shape.
Ideally, a team would like to be able to rely on their centre-backs in a 2-3 rest defence; elite teams like Arsenal, Manchester City and Liverpool are able to do so because of the quality of their central defenders.
Souprayen’s whiffed header for the first goal shows that City do not have the ability to necessarily do that, and will need to either change their rest defence shape or make an adjustment so that the centre-backs are less isolated in transition.
This is something City will want to fix quickly, because at present they are far too open in transition, which is a real death sentence in a league that has always held transitional attacking in high regard.