Jacob Stevens 
Tony Popovic instructs his Socceroos side during game against China. Photo: Dani Brown/Round Ball Australia
The Socceroos triumphed over China in a must-win match in the third phase of World Cup qualifying.
The 3-1 result saw new Australian head coach, Tony Popovic, implement a new style and structure to the Socceroos side.
Rather than continuing with a 4-3-3 as his predecessor did, Popovic instead focused on the talents of the players he had available, opting for a three at the back structure.
But what can we take from this, and what does it mean for the side moving forwards?
The formation
Eyebrows were certainly raised when the lineup was announced, seemingly starting five defenders against what many perceived to be an ‘easier’ opponent in China.
In reality, Popovic opted for three central defenders in Kye Rowles, Harry Souttar and Thomas Deng, flanked by wingbacks Aziz Behich and Lewis Miller.
This actually gave a bit of flexibility to the shapes the team could use in and out of possession.
While it seemed a 5-2-3 on paper, in reality the wingbacks played very advanced – ahead of the double pivot – creating a 3-2-5/3-2-4-1 shape when on the ball.
And then defensively, one wingback would often stay a bit higher and be active in the press, with the other dropping to create a 4-2-4 shape.
These were really smart moves from Popovic. China came out of the sheds incredibly narrow – and persisted with that shape throughout most of the game.
By keeping the wingbacks high, the Socceroos were able to exploit the space out wide, and in defence could settle into a standard four at the back to try and negate attacking threats.
The biggest threat to the side was China’s efficiency on the counter attack – although much of that can be pinned on Deng, who struggled to deal with runners and balls in behind, requiring Souttar to clean up and leaving space more centrally for runners to move into.
This was something that was largely rectified with the half-time substitution of Jason Geria, who looked incredibly assured and rarely (if at all) lost a duel directly against his marker.
Playing through the China press
China employed what appeared to be some sort of trigger press when out of possession.
Rather than it being a scheme-based thing, where players’ movements are determined by those of their teammates, it gave the individuals a bit of initiative to press when and where they felt comfortable.
What that lead to was an omnipresent single player press, and as the ball progressed through each level, it would be the next line of defence that would press.
There was some planned coverage to it – in particular China’s #10, Wei Shihao, would wait for the ball to be played across the Australia backline, and then immediately drop to cover Miller making runs up the wing.
This would then free up Craig Goodwin, who would drop into the space to receive the ball inside the China mid block.
There is no way this wasn’t planned by Popovic and his staff, as it was the core movement that the team anchored around for the entirety of the match.
China’s adjustments
After taking the lead, though, China dropped into a 6-2-2 shape, in an attempt to really try and soak up the pressure.
Their wingers dropped completely out of the press, making the space that Goodwin was able to exploit more scarce.
It was a very flat shape, with a rigid structure that formed the arch-nemesis of recent Socceroos’ sides – a low block.
Of particular note was Wei Shihao’s role in the system. Where he was used to track and cover Miller’s runs in the early stages, he moved instead into a hybrid role with what appeared to be a zonal marking system.
As Shihao pressed the ball carrier in the half space, the next defender would swing around to pick up Miller on the overlap.
This caused constant congestion in the half spaces that Australia looked to utilise, and made it much more difficult for the likes of Goodwin to have an impact in the attacking third.
The McGree effect
So how did Australia overcome this?
Through their own adjustments, of course. Albeit, these were personnel-level, rather than tactical, adjustments.
The big one was introducing Riley McGree at half time for the struggling Nestory Irankunda. Irankunda could not get himself into the game playing the role he was asked, and McGree has the experience and talent to work with in that pseudo-10 role, which is how he was used.
McGree’s ability to turn in tight spaces, his confidence and swagger on the ball reinvigorated that area of the pitch, thereby freeing up space on the other side for Goodwin.
Likewise, his skill to find passes in tight areas unlocked the likes of Jackson Irvine, whose confidence began to grow and saw him move higher up the pitch into a role he more commonly plays at club level.
With there being a credible threat in both half spaces, China found it much more difficult to contain, and their flat, static defence was broken down more easily.
Another player that had a huge impact was Jason Geria. Brought on most likely to deal with the defensive issues Thomas Deng was suffering, he was also a key part in ball progression, pinging line breaking passes into the midfield with ease to bypass that first level of the Chinese press.
Of course, a little bit of individual brilliance from Goodwin helped, but there was a clear shift in the way the Socceroos played after the introduction of McGree, and with it came a reinstated confidence in their own ability to play threatening, fluid football in the attacking third.
Moving forwards
The biggest takeaway from this game, by far, is that Popovic will probably look to continue with the precedent he has set throughout his club career: personnel over tactics.
He will come into every game with a clear plan and approach, and favour player adjustments over changing the gameplan.
When there’s a choice of different player profiles, as was the case here, then it makes sense. But we will have to wait and see how this style plays out when injuries and unavailability make for a less versatile and unique squad makeup.